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New land tenure arrangements in the USSR  from production data and can serve as an appro-
require that agricultural producers pay for land  priate initial value for users' fees.
use.  The current distorted pricing system and the
absence of functioning land markets complicate  Brooks estimates marginal value products
land valuation, and slow the adontion of new  for land for 1,032 collective and state fanns in
property relations.  Lithuania using farm-level data for 1986 and
1987 and compares the marginal value producLs
In a market economy that functions well,  derived from actual received producer prices
agricultural land would earn its approximate  with those derived from border prices with
marginal value product in agricultural produc-  altemative assumed exchange rates for the ruble.
tion.  This value can be measured empirically
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Results Using Lthuanian Production Dat
Ever...  throughout  East and Central Europe and the  Soviet  Union since  January,
1990  have  clarifled  the  common tasks  that  these  countrles  face  In their  efforts  to
replace  defunct  institutlons  of  central  planning  with  a  more  vital  market  mechanism
(see  Brooks,  et.al.,  1991).  Each country  has  adopted  a  unique  mix of  policies  to
move forward  on  this  broadly  common  agenda.  In fall  of  1990 It  became apparent  that
the  Soviet  Unlon was diverging,  perhaps  temporarily,  from  the  directions  of  her  East
and  Central  European  neighbors.  The  Gorbachev  government  at  the  Union  level  In
October,  1990  promulgated  a  set  of  guidelines  that  Imply continued  administrative
control  of  many  aspects  of  the  economy,  including  pricing  and  procurement,  and
continued  state  ownership of  most  productive  assets.  The guldelines  seek  to  capture
many gains  of  a market  economy without  allowing markets  to  function.  They thus  pose
the  need for  Imaginative administrative  behavior  that  mimics the  market mechanism. The
effort  to  ellcit  such  behavior  through  the  piece-meal  reforms  of  the  past  has  not
been  successful.
The  hiatus  in  the  Soviet  transitlon,  whether  temporary  or  permanent,  has
profound  Implications for  agriculture  and particularly  for  land tenure.  The differences
In land tenure  In the  Soviet  Unlon and East/Central  European countries  throughout  the
post  war period  were evident,  but  were masked by managerial practices  that  muted the
importance  of  formal  property  rights  In land.  The formalities  remained, however,  and
throughout  East  and Central  Eu-ope  the  state  owned little  agricultural  land.  Ev'3n in
countries  that  were  fully  collectivized,  Individuals  retained  formal  title  to  much land,
and where they  had surrendered  title,  It  was usually  to  the  collective,  rather  than  to
the  state.
Throughout  Eastern  and Central Europe debates  about  land ownership over  the
past  year  have  centered  on  the  Issue of  which competing  private  property  claims hold
priority  and how they  should be  recognized,  rather  than  the  more elementary  Issue  of-2-
the  legItImac-  of  privnte ownership  o!  lard.  Incomplete  nationalizatlon  of  land In
Eastern  and Central  Europe  appears  markedly  to have  altered the political  economy  of
agricultural reform, and weakened  the  constituency of  support for  the Inherited
system.
In the USSR,  private ownership  of  land Is at this writing not yet  legal  at  the
Unlon  level,  despite  recent legislation  that legalized  private ownership  of other assets.
Republics  are proceeding  with  their own land laws  that recognize  different forms of
Individual  tenure with  varying  restrictions on transferability. Although  It Is difficult to
predict the future course of policies,  It appears  le3s liKely  that fully functioning  land
markets  will  develop  In the USSR  In the near term than In Eastern  Europe. The state
will retain ownership  of  most If not all agricultural  land, but will allow  a more  diverse
set  of  users to  have contractual access to  the  land.  The parties Involved In
contractual agreements  will be  the  state  and collective farms, local  councils,
Individuals,  and small  cooperatives.
Under  the new tenurlal  arrangements,  those who  farm land are to pay for  the
use of  It.  With  land markets constrained  or  Inactive, land use fees must be set
administratively.  There  Is no consensus  In the Soviet  economics  literature yet on how
best to value  land  administratively.  The Union  level  land law  of  March,  1990 mandates
a full scale land cadastre to  record characteristics  of  land.  Reliance  on cadastral
results would  greatly postpone  the Introduction  of land  use fees.  Furthermore,  there
Is no clear methodology  for  transforming  cadastral  surveys Into land values.
In a well  functioning  competitive  market  economy,  agricultural  land  would  earn
Its marginal  value product In agricultural  production.  This value can be measured
empirically  from production  data and actual or proposed  prices.  The  marginal  value
product will  depend  on the structure of output prices,  the productlon  technology,  and
managerial  efficiency at the farm level.  Valuation  of  land Is Intimately  llnked  to  the-3-
structure  of  output  prices,  and the  impact of  price  llberalizatIon or  administratl-
pricek  revislon on optimal  users fees can be shown.
This approach  to  land valuation Is approximate  at  best, and would not be
necessary If  Iand markets were permitted  to  functlon.  It  has the advantage  of
simplicity  and  speed,  and allows  tenure reform  to proceed  before the lengthy  cadastre
Is completed. It furthermore  provides  a benchmark  with  which  to  evaluate  the claims
of  farm chalrmen  that user fees (which  they pay) should  be very low but fees for
Intra-fam  leaseholds  (whlch  they collect) quite high.
The calculatlon  of  marginal  value  products for  land  of  differing quality Is a
simple  technical  exercise that embodles  no assumptlons  about allocat?ve  efficlency,
market  clearing,  or prices that reflect scarcity values. To step further and argue
that marginal  value  products are optimal  user fees does require strong assumptions,
In particular  that other factors of  production  are priced according  to their scarcity
values,  and that farm managers  are ailocatively  efficient.  When  these conditions  do
not hold, the administrator  given the unenviable  task of  stimulating  market  behavior
without a market has several choices. He or she can adjust user fees to  reflect
distortions elsewhere,  or can attempt  through administrative  means  to  remove  these
distortions.  The  measurement  of  marginal value  products,  and  particularly
demonstration  of their dependence  on the structure of output prices, simply  expands
the set of  empirical  Information  that can be used for  administrative  decision  making.
The Introductbon  of  a genulne  market  mechanism  would  greatly reduce the need for
continued  administratlon  of  the economy. Under  several  plausible  paths of  transition
to  a  functioning market mechanism,  however, initlal administrative  valuation of
agricultural  land  Is required. An  empirical  understanding  of the marginal  value  products
of  land could therefore generate  Informatlon  useful for  a genuine  transition.
In the following  discussion  I use farm level data from Lithuanian  state  and
collective  farms to esthnate  the marginal  value product of  land under the 1986 and- 4 -
1987 output  price structure,  and what It would be If  producers had recelved world
trading prices  but  used unchanged technology and did not  adjust  to  the  dlfferent
relathve prlf  9.
The particular parameter estimates In this work do not generalize to  the Sovlet
Union as  a  whole.  Producer  prices  for  grains In  1986  and  1987  were higher  In
Lithuania than  In  the  graln  belt  of  the  USSR,  and prices  for  livestock  products,
particularly milk, were lower than In more easterly  regions.  Because the USSR  Is so
large and Its separate regions have not  been connected through rationally Interlinked
prices,  It  Is Inappropriate to  genera!tir  about the effects  of  reform on the USSR  as
a  whole from  analysis of  a  partIcular  region.  Conclusions based on  analysls of
average prices throughout the USSR  do not capture the potential for  better  utilization
of  regional comparative advantage and Interregional trade within the c,)untry,  and this
woud be a major payoff  of  the reform.  The methodological  approach of  this paper;
Le.; estimation of  marginal value  products  of  land under alternative  output  price
structures,  could be used throughout  the  USSR  as  the  methodology of  valuation If
land markets continue to  be repressed.
The following discussion Is  based on  data  from the  1986  and 1987  annual
accounts  (godovye otchety)  of  1032 state  and collective  farms In Lithuanla.  The
LlthuanIan  data are additionally valuable because they Include  measures  of  land quality
rarely  available with  production  data.  Lithuanian researchers  have made detailed
analysis of  different  soil types on each of  the state  and collective farms.  Each  farm
Is assigned a  soil quallty Indicator (bonitet)  based on the  yield of  a standard crop
(standardized according to  feed units) on comparable  soil under conditlons of  average
management.  The variable measuring  land quality (bonitet) ranges from 27 to  66 with
a mean value of  41.Price  Reorm and Land  Valuation
The  price structure affects the returns to operators  working  under  alternative
tenurlal arrangements.  Valuation  under the current pricing system,  wlth  a multpilcity
of pricew  for the same  product, Is difficult and  ybilds  distor*ed  asset values  and poor
resource use.  The centrality of  land valuation  to  the pr cess of  tenurial reform
makes  It very difficult to  pronote now  property relations  wlthout price reform.  Tho
price reform would  Ideally  constitute a full liberalization  of  prices, but would  as a
minimum  correct distortions In relative prices and remove  farm specific deviations  from
provaillng prices.
Land  has historically  been  offered to farms  In the Sovlet  Union  wlthout  charge.
Impilclt  land rents have been collectod  through differentlated, farm s'eclfIc  output
prices. One  obJective  of  the economic  reform is to make  the domestic  price system
more  consistent with world  prices.  Ti9  can be attempted  by setting output prics
equal  to border  prices (adJusted  for transportation  costs), and  deriving  land  use fees
based on the marginal  value product of  land with existing factor  productivity and
technology.
Translation  of  border prices Into domestic prices requires choice of  an
exchange  rate, and no readlly defensible  candidate  Is avaQ  Domestic  relative
prices can  be allgned  with  border  prices,  however,  and  the price level  made  conditional
upon the ehosen  exchange  rate.
Lithuanian  Producer  Prices
Prices  recelved  by Lithuanlan  producers  for  sales to  the state are shown  In
Table 1 and displayed  to  show the dispersion  among  farms.  The prices are unit
values,  and Include  all premia  for quality,  quantity,  and farm  specific differentials. For
example,  the one quarter of  milk  producers  who  received  the lowest prices In 1987
were paid less than 335 rubles per ton of  fluld milk,  while  the quarter of producers-6-
who received the hlghest prices were pald between 352 and 410 rubles per ton.  The
base price for  milk In Lithuanla at  the tine  was 310 rubles p'.,r ton.
Comparison  of  Lithuanlan prices with those In Latvia, Estonla, and Belorussba
Indicates some significant  differences.  Belorusslan prices  for  milk and  meat are
slgnificantly hlgher, as shown  In Table 2.  The price dispersion across repubiics within
this relatively small  region Illustrates the adjustments that reform would bring.  These
adjustments would facilltate  better  use of  resources  specific  to  each locality,  and
expanded gains from Interregional trade within the  country.
Procurement organizations have traditionally pald dlfferent  prices to  different
farms for  the same product.  Price differentlation  enters  through zonal pricing and
through the  bonus system.  Several bonuses can raise received prices  above base
prices.  The most Important are quality differentlals,  bonuses for  sales In excess of
a moving average of  past years, and premia  for  farms In financial stress.1
The Lithuanian data show price differentiation,  but  the degree appears to  be
less  than  reported  In other  parts  of  the  Soviet  Union. In  1987  15  percent  of
Lithuanlan state  and collective farms had profitability  (rentabel'nost) of  10 percent
or  less  (which would qualify them for  bonuses of  up to  75  percent  of  base prices
In many parts  of  the country).  The data do not  show that these farms received high
bonus prices for  meat or  milk, suggesting that  special bonuses for  financlally weak
farms were not  widely used In Lithuania.
A strong  negative correlation between meat prices and land quality In 1987 Is
shown In Table 3, Indicating that  farms on poor quality land were paid higher prices
for  livestock  products.  The 1986 data  also show a  strong  negative  correlation
between meat and milk prices  and land quality.  Dlfferentiated  prices  for  livestock
products appear to be the mechanism  through which Implicit  land rents  were ecollected
In this region.Borc 4ar prices convorted Into rubles at exchange rates of  two and four  rubles
to  the dollar are also shown In Table I  for  reference  and comparison.  The border
prices  for  commercially  traded  products  are  prices  c.l.f.  northern  European ports
&djusted to  farm gate product definitions.2 For example,  the beef price Is beef c.l.f.
northern European  ports  adjusted to live welght using the standard Soviet coefficlent
of  .55 live welght to  carcass weight.  The boruer price for  mlik Is equlvalent to  $10
per hundredwelght  converted to  rubles at  the stated  exchange rate.3
For little  traded  products,  such as  potatoes,  the  listed  border price Is  the
marginal  price of  the third quarter of  domestic producers; 75  percent  of  Llthuanlan
producers recelved a price at  or below the  llsted price,  In choosing this price for
nontraded products,  I assumed  that  the price (for  average quality) after  the reform
would be based not on the hlghest current  price, but on one that  was In the high end
of  the current  range.
Relative prices In Llthuanla  In 1987 differed  from border prices; grains and mli
were relatively  low and meat high.  Virtually  all dalry  producers received  less  than
border prices even at two rubles to  the dollar and the difference  Is greater at  four.
Meat prices were not  as low relative to  world values as were milk prices.
Output Prices, Land Quality, and Profitabillty
Differentiated prices and meticulous  measurement  of  land quality were Intended
to  capture  rents  assoclated with preferential  access to  land at  no cost  (Poshkus,
1P79).  If  the  system worked weii, farF2a  would show a  range of  profitabillty,  but
there  would be no systematic link between land quality and profitabillty,  unless some
other  factor  contributing to  profitability  were strongly  correlated with land quality.
Table 3 shows palr-wise correlation  coefficlents  for  prices, land quality, and
profitability  In 1987.  For example,  farms that recelved high prices for  rye tended also
to  receive hlgh prices for  barley, as Indicated by the positive, significant correlation
coefficient  of  .28.  Individual  product prices tended not to  be strongly correlated wlthlam  profitability,  except for  poultry.  Land quality, on the other lhand, was positively
and slgnificantly correlated with profitability;  the correlation coefficlent  Is .36 between
land quality (bonltet)  and profitability  (rentabelrnost').  Farms In the  lowest quarter
according to  profitability  had an average Indicator of  land quality of  38.50, compared
to  44.52 for  farms In the hlghest quarter of  profitability.
Even though  there  Is  a  significant  correlation  between  land  quality  and
measured profitability  (suggesting  that  not  all  implicit land rents  are  taxed  away
through prices), not  all farms with hlgh quallty land are highly profit-,le.  The range
of  land quallty within profitability  groupings Is  greater  than  the  difference  In mean
quality across groupings.
Regression analysis Indicates that  varlation  In land quality  Is  a  slgnificant
contributor  to  variation  In net  output  when output  is aggregated  with actual  unit
values received  by  each farm.  Regression coefficlents  for  log  llnear production
functions  are shown In Table 4.4  The dependent variable In Table 4  Is  farm level
net output  aggregated at  prices actually received.  Net output  excludes all product
used for  feed,  whether produced on  the  farm or  purchased.  Output  prices  vary
among  farms, and hence this dependent variable Is flawed as a measure  of  farm level
output  or productivity.  It does allow, however, a view of  the contributlon of  factors
of  production to  farm revenues under the prevailing distorted  pricing structure.
The Independent  variables In this  rogression  are iand quallty (bonitet),  land
quantity (one unit of  cropland Is assumed  equivalent to  two units of  hay land), labor
In reported  hours  worked, ruble  expenditures on  fertilizer,  machinery In reported
horsepower units, and an aggregate of  animals  with swine,  sheep, and goats welghted
at  .3 of  a cow.  The table shows separate e_.  :nates  for  the  full  samples  of  over
one  thousand  farms  In  1986  and  1987,  and sub-samples In  1987  In  profitability
groupings.-9-
Results  for  another  set  of  regresslons  are  displayed In  Table  S.  The
dependent varlable In Table 5  Is net  output  aggregated at  border  prices Invarlant
across farms and converted Into rubles at  two rubles to  the dollar.  The Independent
variables  In  Table  5  are  the  same as  In Table  4.  The difference  In  estimated
coefficlents  In Tables 4 and 6 thus shows  the effect  of  the domestic price structure
on  returns  to  factors  of  productlon  compared to  returns  using world prices  (but
keeping the same technology and physical productivity.)
If price differentlation  (In the domestic  price structure)  had succeeded In fully
capturing  rents  associated  with  superior  land quallty,  the  regresslon  coefficient
associated with land quality (bonitet)  In Table 4 would presumably  be small.  It  Is In
fact  rather  large (.53 for  1986) and precisely measured  (t-12.74).  When  net  output
Is aggregated with border prices Invariant across farms (Table 5), the contributlon of
land quality to  variatlon In net  output  Is even greater  (coefficlent  - .81, t-20.66).
This suggests that  the current  prices differentiated  a%  the farm level capture  some
of  the  rent  associated with hlgh quality land, but not  all.
Descriptive data characterizing the farms In the 1987 samples  are displayed In
Table 6.  Table 6 Indicates that  farms with different  leveos  of  profitability  show little
difference  In farm size (mean  size Is about  2200 hectares of  cropland and welghted
hayland  In each category).  Jore profitable farms pay silghtly higher wages but  emrioy
the same number  of  hours, spend a little  more on fertilizer,  command  more machinery
power, and have a few more animals. The fams of  different  levels of  profitability  are
remarkable for  their  similarity In average command  of  factors  of  production.  They
differ  more In net output  than In Inputs, and the difference  Is more pronounced under
the domestic price structure  than under world prices.
Marginal  Value Products of  Land With  Current and Reformed  Prices
Marginal  value products  for  all factors  of  production calculated from sample
means  of  the 1987 regressions with actual prices are displayed In Table 7.  Marginal- 10  -
value  products  for  land quantity  and  quality  evaluated  at  sample means for  all
regressions are shown In Table 8.
The estimated margInal  value products  (Table 8) range from approxbnately 40
rubles per hectare of  average quality land to  approximately  150, depending on year,
olvislon of  the samj;  -,  and prices used to  aggregate net  output.  The full sample  of
1032  farms In 1987 shows a  low value for  a  hectare  of  average quality land (40
rubles).  When  the sample  Is broken Into profitability  groups, the dispersion of  quallty
withIn the  groups  Is reduced somewhiat,  since quallty and profitability  are positively
correlated.  In the profitabilIty  based subsamples,  the value of  a hectare of  average
quality land (average for  the group) Is greater  and the value of  a unitary  deviation
of  quality from average Is reduced.
The substitution  of  uniform border  prices  (at  two rubles to  the  dollar)  for
actual received prices raises both the value of  a hectare of  average quality land and
the value of  deviations from average quality, since the contribution of  quality Is not
taxed away through the price system.  This Is apparent In both  1986 and 1987.
The estimated values for  land quantity appear reasonable, although they span
a wide range.  One could conclude conservatively that  a farm manager able to  sell
output  at  border  prices  (at  two  rub!as  to  the  dollar)  would  be  willing to  pay
approximately  one hur ired  rubles for  use of  a hectare of  average quallty cropland,
If  payments to  other  factors  of  production  do  not  exceed their  marginal value
products.
Introducing payments  for  land while  retaining the current price structure  would
be more problematical. The regressions Indicate that  the user fee  for  land would be
lower, perhaps  by as much  as a half, and the gradation according to quality would also
be  less  than  If  output  prices  were  revised.  Introducing  uniform  user  fees
(differentiated  by  quality)  wlthout  output  price  revision  would penalize livestock- 1  1  -
producers on hlgh quality land.  User fees without price reform or revislon could thus
bring a negative Instead of  positive supply response.
Is 100 rubles per hectare a hlgh or  low rental rate?  Milnnesota's  mixed  dairy,
feed, wheat, hogs, and sugar beet economy  Is superficially similar  to  Lithuanla's.  Cash
rents  In Minnesota have been declining since  1983 and were In 1989 $S0 per acre
(240 rubles per hectare  at  2 rubles to  the dollar) for  average quality land.
Now can the measurement  of  the  contribution of  land quality best  be used?
This Is a nontraditional Input, measured  on a per hectare basis.  The attempt to  value
It directly as If It were a traditional varlable Input yields unrealistically high values for
a unit of  bonitet (e.g., see Table  7).  If used for  policy purposes this would Imply  that
land of  slightly less than average quality should be offered  without fee,  and land of
slightly higher than average quality should command  a much  higher fee.  An alternative
to  dir"-ct valuation of  a unit  of  land quality Is to  exploit the measured contribution
of  bonitet  to  the  marginal  value product  of  a hectare  of  land. 1 A farm that  was
average In other iespects  but had land quality of  30 units Instead of  the mean  value
of  41 earned a marginal  value product  (with actual  1987 prices) of  37 rubles per
hectare, rather  than 40.  An average farm with bonitet  equal to  50 earned a marginal
value product  of  land of  47 rubles per  hectare.  These values understate  actual
contribution of  land quality to  physical productivity,  since price distortions  mute the
Impact of  land quality on  farm revenue.  The measured coefficlents  of  land quality
when  border prices, rather  than domestic prices, are used are slgniflcantly higher, and
knply a  larger deviation of  land's marginal  value product  associated with lower and
higher quality land. 5
I  This  strehes th  teal  tW  preton of the elasty  of fm  outPut  or rvenue  with respect  to land
quawly,  since  we are evaluatg  Xt  contbution of land quality  at a valwu ar from its mean.  It offems
appa  reasonab vWaluafton  of hcares  o  land of dfflerent  quafi,  however,  and Is thus atmract for
pratil  purposes. I tank  Robet Doulman  for suggest  ih  uts  measured  conbution o  bof L- 12 -
The analysis further  suggests that  a share contract  In Lithuania In which all
Inputs  bosides land are  separately priced  should give  the  parent  fam  about  10
percent of output,  plus perhaps a risk premium. 6 The share of  revenue pald for  land
should not  exceed the share of  land's contribution to  net output  If land Is to be pald
Its marginal  value product, and costs  of  other purchased Inputs are not shared.  The
regression coefficlents  for  land quantity using actual prices recelved (Table 4) range
from .07 to  11 In the subsamples,  and are .045 and .13 In the full samples  for  1987
and 1986, respectively.
From  these estimated elasticitles, It can be concluded that  the share of  land's
contribution to  variatlon In net  output  Is approxlmately  10 percent,  and not  greater
than 15 percent.  Land users asked to  pay a higher share than this for  use of  land
will  adopt uneconcmically  land-saving technology that  will Increase society's  costs  of
producing a given level of  output.  The fragmentary evidence on lease contracting
reported  from various regions of  the USSR  suggests that  collective  and state  farm
managers often  charge  share leaseholders a  higher share than  can  reasonably be
expected to  correspond to  land's contribution to  net  output  (Brooks, 1990).
Border Prices at  Which  Exchange  Rate?
Border prices at two rubles to the dollar represent relative prices slgnificantly
dlfferent  from producer prices In Llthuanla In 1W87. Border prices for  milk and grain
were higher and meat lower.  Border prices converted  at  two  rubles to  the  dollar,
however, had a surprisingly small  combined  Impact on mean  net  farm output.  Since
most farms In Lithuania are diversified producers of  milk, meat, and cash crops,  the
price  changes  Introduced with  border  prices  (at  two  rubles  to  the  dollar)  were
offsetting  In their  Implied  Impact on aggregate farm Incomes. This Is shown In Table
6; there Is virtually no difference  In mean  net output  calculated with actual prices and
border prices converted  at  two rubles to  the  dollar.- 13 -
The adoption of  border prices would brlng galns and losses at  the farm level
even though the  Impact on mean net output  Is small.  Nlnety percent  of  producers
In 1987 would have had net  farm output  at border prices (at two rubles to  the dollar)
within a  range of  83  percent  to  116 percent  of  received net  farm output  (actual
prices).  The ninety percent Interval for  1986 Is bounded by .81 and 1.19.  Thus the
Introductlon of  prices based on border prices converted at  two rubles to  the dollar
would brlng short  run gains and  osses between 10 percent  and 20 percent of  farm
Income for  ten  percent  of  farms.  Long run  changes would depend on  the  supply
response to  the  new relative  price structure.
The finding  that  net  farm output  In Lithuanla would change llttle  If  border
prices  (at  two rubles to  the dollar) were substituted  for  current  prices Is new and
bnportant.  Its  Importance Is enhanced by  the absence of  any rlgorously  Justifiable
estImates of  an equIlibrlum  exchange rate for  the  ruble.
Wlthout knowledge of  an equlilbrIum  exchange rate,  and In the absence of  a
general price liberalIzation, those deslgning administrative adjustments of  agricultural
producer prices must use their Judgement  about what exchange rates  are feasible In
a partial, sector  specific  price revision, considering the Impact on farm Incomes  and
consumer budgets.  The LIthuanlan data  Indlcate that  an  Implied  exchange rate  of
fewer  than  two rubles to  the  dollar would bring  a hlghly undesirable supply shock
associated wlth the new price structure.  In some parts  of  the Soviet Union where
producer  costs  and prices  are  higher than In Lithuanla, a supply shock may be a
necessary part  of  the adjustment process to  remove marginal  producers.  There Is
little  Indication of  a need for  exit of  many  marginal  producers In Lithuania, If they can
operate with the current  relatively low producer prices.
Although 1987 levels of farm Income  were roughly consistent with an exchange
rate  of  two rubles  to  the  dollar, and producers realized  Implicit rents  under  the
current  system, It would be difficult  to  Introduce land payments wlthout raising the- 14 -
general level of  producer prices and Incomes. Farms  retained impllilt  land rents  and
reallocated them to  cover other expenses and Investment.  If required to  pay expllcit
rents  wlthout augmented Incomes,  many farms would have been pushed further  Into
financial difficulty  or  bankruptcy.  Almost half  of  the  fams  In Lithuanla In 1987 fell
In the  range of  profitability  considered to  Indlcate questlonable long-term  financil
viabIllty.  There  Is  little  economic justification  for  forcing  exit  of  producers  who
cannot compete  at an overvalued exchange  rate, and most observers would agree that
the  ruble Is  overvalued at  two to  the  dollar.  Producer prices  have changed since
1987, but  macroeconomic  deterioration  at  the  national level has probably Increased
the gap between domestic and world agricultural prices.
An Implied  rate  of  three  or  four  rubles  to  the  dollar would In  1987 have
allowed payments for  land and higher producer Incentives for  most products.  If the
chosen exchange rate with which  to  translate border prices Into ruble prices Is higher
than the equilibrlum  rate  that  emerges  as the economy  opens, agricultural prices can
be expected to  adjust  upward over  time.  The constralnt  In cholce of  an exchange
rate on which to  base revised agricultural producer prices Is clearly what the demand
side can absorb at the  time of  revislon.
Price Reform and Demand  Side Constraints
Producer prices based on border prices converted at three or  four  rubles to
the dollar run  directly Into  constraints  Imposed  by the  demand  side.  Consumers  will
face  significantly higher prices  when the  subsidy covering  the  difference  between
retail  prices and current  producer prices Is removed.  The demand  side adjustment
would be even greater  If subsIdles were removed and producer prices simultaneously
revised upward, as would be the case with a ruble exchange rate  of  3 or  4 to  the
dollar.
Retail price policy has stymied revision or  reform of  producer prices In the
past,  and It  continues to  present  difficult  dilemmas. Retall prices  are kept  iow by- 15 -
large payments from the  state  budget.  This component  of  the  agrieultural subs1dy
cost  90 billion rubles at  ths national level In 1989, or roughly 11 percent  of GNP.  The
coe 4 was estimated to Increase to  115 billion rubles In 1990, with additlonal increases
In early 1991.  In Lithuania the budgetary cost  of  the subsidy for  food  consumed  In
the repubilc In 1989 was 1.39 blillon rubles, or about 30 rubles per capita per monUt7
If the subsidy were distrlbuted as a compensatory per capita payment  of  thirty
rubles  per month, It  would augment the  money Income  of  a family of  four  with two
earners on average 30 percent.  The compensation  would  be a higher relative payment
for  poorer and larger families.  Without  detailed Information  on !ncome distribution and
family budgets, It  Is difficult  to  Judge whether compensation  of  this magnitude  would
exceed or fall short of  the Increment In food costs  for  most families.  The subsides
are  known to  go  disproportionately  to  higher  Income urban  familles who  have
preferential access to  food at  subs!dIzed  prices.  It Is thus likely that removal of  the
subsidies and distribution  of  the  total  as  equal per  capita compensatory payments
would overcompensate many poorer familles and undercompensate  the  wealthler.  It
would thus improve  the income  distribution without distorting wage payments  by linking
componsation  to  wages.
If revised producer prices were based on an exchange  rate  of  three or four
rubles to  the  dollar, retail  prices would be even higher, since the  current  subsidy
would be removed  and producer prices would simuitaneously  be Increased by a factor
of  1.5 or  2 on average.  in that  case per capita monthly payments of  thirty  rubies
would leave many  familles unable to  cover their  additional food  costs,  and arguments
in  favor  of  a  targeted  compensation  program would Increase.  Means tested  and
commodity  specific compensation  programs  could be considered. Poorer people receive
much of  thelr  subsidy through dairy products, which are widely avallable in Lithuania
at  subsidized prices.- 16  -
Concluslons
The old  price system, along with constraints  on  marketing and Input supply,
Ilmits the  attractiveness  of  new tenurial  relations  to  producers,  and distorts  the
values of  agricultural  land.  The multipllilty  of  prices  complicates the  contractual
negotlations and leads to  monetizatlon  of  current  distorted  asset  values.
Lithuanlan farm accounts for  1986 and 1987 suggest that  farms at  that  time
received on average between 40 and 100 rubles annually In producer rents  for  use
of  e  hectare  of  average quality land.  Producer rents  on  Individual farms varied
according to  the prices received on that  particular farm.  If prices were standardized
and changed to  border prices  converted  at  two  rubles to  the  dollar,  the  marginal
value product  of  average quality land would be higher (146 rubles per hectare In the
1986 data,  and 90  rubles  In the  1987 data).  Farms coWd be  asked to  pay  that
amount In rent  without exceeding land's contribution  to  net  output.
If prices were aligned  with world prices at  two rubles to  the dollar, however,
most Lithuanlan  farms would not have Increased their Incomes  very much,  and payment
of  100  rubles  per  hectare  would have worsened financial  stress.  If  prices  were
standardized and Increased to  border prices converted at  three rubles to  the dollar
Instead  of  two,  the  marginal value  product  of  average  quality  land  would  be
approxhmately  150 rubles per hectare  (1987 data).  Producers could pay that  much
without additional financial stress,  although movements  In prices of  other  Inputs are
also relevant.
If all agricultural users pald land use fees and had access to  the same prices
for  Inputs and output,  state  and collective  farm managers  would be more eager to
offer  land lor  lease or private proprletorship or ownership. Agr!cultural price reform
would thus facilitate  changes In land tenure and land management.
Producer prices corresponding to  border prices converted at  three rubles to
the  dollar would present  a shock to  retall prices.  Consumers  probably could not  be
fully  compensated  for  the Increase, and targeted  compensation  would be appropriate.- 17  -
Table  1: LUthuanian  Producor  Prices
(Uit  values,  rubles  per  ton,  1987  V/)
Grouped  Accordhg  to  Prices  Received
Lowest  Highest  Base  Border  Border
25%  Median  75%  Prices  2  rubles/$  4  rubles/$
Rye  162  169  186  170
Barley  135  150  172  130  260  520
Oats  115  136  171
Wheat  125  133  160  130
Potatoes  125  143  167  125  167  334
Beets  59  59  61  58  40  80
Beans  323  476  625
Fruit  254  334  400  398  796
Beef  *  2,506  2,680  2,892  1,550  2,220  4,440
Mutton  *  2,564  2,651  2,798  2,200  1,540  3,080
Pork  *  2,447  2,685  3,000  2,100  1,540  3,080
Poultry  *  2,000  2,079  2,323  1,540  3,080
Milik  335  343  352  310  440  880
Wool  4,626  5,000  5,667  5,000  10,000
*  IJve  weight
Sources: (a)  Godovye otchety, 1987, Lthuanian SSR.
(b)  Chursin,  A.M. Tsenv i kachestvo  sel'skokhoziaistvennol  Produktsli,  Moscow, Kolos, 1984.
(c)  1987-88  Commodit  Trade and Price Trends. John Hopkins University  Press, 1988.
Price ProsPects  tor Maior Primarv  ComffiMies,  1988-2000.  The World Bank, 1989.- 18  -
Table  2:  Producer  PRes I988
Av7e&e  Unit  Values  (tubles  per  ton) _
Toal ReepWTdTomal  T  to State
ESTONIA  BELORUSSIA  LATVIA  LITHUANIM
Collective  State  Collective  State  Collective  State  Collective  1987
Rye  221.5  220.9  190.1  187.2  214.3  221.3  180.1
Barley  171.1  151.5  176.5  169.5  160.7  166.4  155.3
Potatoes  244.1  230.5  153.3  154.6  208.2  183.2  155.4
Beef  2,586.4  Z50s.2  3,406.7  3,361.4  2,902.2  2,881.3  2,689.7
Pork  2,303.5  2,285.1  2,912.9  2,568.6  2,599.7  2,501.0  2,720.5
Mik  370.4  367.6  497.5  528.1  414.1  421.2  343.8
Sugar-beets  70.4  75.3  85.9  91.0  60.8
Source:  Gcdovye  Otchety,  Svodnye,  1988,  listed  republics-19-
Table 8:  Correlation  Coefficients  for  Price
Len  Qutlity,  Farm  Profitability
Land  Farm
Rye  Barley  Beets  Beef  Milk  Wheat  Oats  Pork  Poultry  Quality  Profitability
Rye  1.00
(800)*




Beef  .21  1.00
(260)  (1030)
Milk  .12  .2S  .41  1.00
(798)  (260)  (1028)  (1028)
eh"t  .12  .17  1.00
(S62)  (734)  (766)
Oats  28  .21  1.00
(420)  (488)  (48S)
Pork  -. 10  .25  .54  .2S  1.00




Quality  -.55  -. 20  -.47  1.00
(1027  (102S)  (1017)  (1028)
Fam
ProfTlt bT  I Tey  .11  .14  .10  .19  .23  .36  1.00
(PCb  (948)  (1028)  (1020)  (148)  (1028)  (1082)
All  coofficients  significant  *t  .006 level.  Price.  are  unit  value. Land quality  ts bonTt t.
o(  )  Indicates  number  of  observations.  Profitability  (rentabel'nost)  =  (ernings-costs)/coas.-20-
Table 4:  Estimated Cofticient  for  Log Linear  Production Functions
Lithuania,  Actual  Received  Pricaem  !
1986  1987
FullI  FullI
Sampl  e  Sample  Prof it  1 S/  Profit  2  Profit  3  2  Profit  4  VY
Intercept  3.69  3.42  3.37  3.04  4.01  3.35
(13.43)kI  (11.89)  (6.68)  (6.26)  (7.80)  (8.33)
Land Quality  21  .S3  .4S  .24  .28  .20  .41
(12.74)  (10.41)  (2.82)  (3.54)  (2.62)  (6.51)
Land  Quantity  h/  .1J  .045  .07  .11  .07  .10
(4.63)  (1.50)  (1.30)  (2.08)  (1.31)  (1.97)
Labor ±1  .29  .34  .45  .44  .38  .39
(10.68)  (11.13)  (7.98)  (8.03)  (7.70)  (6.79)
Fertilizer  1/  .04  .10  .18  .10  .12  .05
(2.62)  (4.43)  (3.56)  (2.63)  (3.37)  (1.28)
Machinery k/  .13  .18  .10  .14  .18  .17
(7.06)  (8.13)  (2.49)  (3.81)  (4.52)  (3.82)
Animals V  .30  .2S  .14  .18  .18  .24
(14.69)  (12.05)  (3.65)  (5.66)  (4.47  (8.28)
R 2 .73  .73  .74  .80  .78  .79
*/  Dependent  variablo  is  not  output  S/  bonit
aggregated  with  actual  prices  recelved
h/  Land  cropland  +  .6 hayland
b/  t-stat;ce  I/  Labor 2  hours worked In  agriculture
e/  Profit  < 15.70%  J/  Fertilizer  = total  ruble expenditures
d/  16.69%  < Profit  < 23.58%  k/  Machinery  n total  horsepowr
*/  23.65%  C  Profit  < 32.01%  1  Animuls = cow +  .3  (hogs and  pigs)  .
.8  (sheep *nd  gots)
f/  Profit  > 32%
Source:  Godovyc  otchety,  Litovskala  SSR,  1987, 1988.-21 -
Table S:  Estimated  CeeftIele.nt  for  Log  Lie.ar  ProduCtion Fq  lctown.
Lithuania,  3ordw  Priem  at  2 rublev/lt  YI'
1986  1987
full  Full
Saple  Sample  Profit  1  9/  Profit  2  Profit  3  Profit  4
Intercept  2.12  2.39  2.41  1.70  4.01  2.6s
(8.22)k/  (8.79)  (5.00)  (3.57)  (8.05)  (5.22)
Land  Quality  .81  .71  .62  .57  .20  .s8
(20.68)  (17.21)  (7.72)  (7.33)  (2.62)  (8.41)
Land  Quantity  .18  .10  .14  .15  .07  .14
(6.94)  (3.60)  (2.49)  (2.79)  (1.31)  (3.13)
Labor  .33  .35  .45  .48  .38  .41
(18.05)  (12.36)  (8.28)  (8.53)  (7.70)  (7.73)
Fertilizer  .06  .09  .08  .12  .12  .05
(3.70)  (4.46)  (2.28)  (3.31)  (3.37)  (1.34)
Machinery  .14  .18  .10  .11  .16  .14
(7.59)  (7.73)  (2.57)  (3.14)  (4.52)  (3.52)
Animals  .21  .20  .10  .14  .1S  .21
(10.81)  (10.41)  (2.73)  (4.61)  (4.74)  (8.00)
R 2 .78  .77  .77  .83  .78  .82
*/  Dependent  variable  Is  net  output  aggregated  with  border  prices  converted  at  2 rubles/il.
b/  t-statistics
c/  Profit  1:  Rentabel'not.t  <  15.70%
d/  Profit  2:  15.69X  < Rentabel>nost < 23.85X
*/  Profit  3:  23.64%  < Rentabel'nost  < 32.01X
fJ  Profit  4:  32%  < Rentabel'nost
Source:  Codovy. otchety,  Litovskala  SSR, 1987, 1988.-22-
Table St  Saple  _ess, t#
FullI
Sample  Profit  1 !  Profit  2  Y  Profit  a  Profit  4 4/
No. tn  samplo  1,032  260  269  259  257
Land  Quality
(bonitot)  40.92  38.60  a9.53  41.13  44.52
Land Quantity
(hotaros)  2,199  2,236  2,171  2,189  2,200
Labor  (hours)  638,798  538,335  532,525  651,741  622,447
wags
(i*ublos/hour)  1.32  1.19  1.30  1.33  1.49
Fortl  I izr
Expenditure
in  rubles  130,608  129,492  126,799  130,324  13S,818
Machinery
(Horepower)  13,639  12,412  13,194  13,859  16,104
Anmale(w.ighted
aggreated
cow  =  1)  1,088  930  1,030  1,080  1,234
Net  output
(actual  prices)  1,991,851  1,691,212  1,869,373  2,090,193  2,423,374
Not output
(border prices)
2 rubles  = 81)  1,971,870  1,690,417  1,838,058  2,071,387  2,396,070
Net output
(border pricos
4 rubles  = 81)  3,943,741  3,180,834  3,672,111  4,142,775  4,792,140
a/  Profit  1: RentabelOnost  < 16.70%
b/  Profit  2:  15.69%  Rentabl  nost < 23.85X
c/  Profit  3:  23.64U  < Rentabl'nost  < 32.01%
d/  Proftt  4:  32X (  M.ntabel'nost
Source:  Godovy*  otchey,  Llto*vskal  SSR,  1987.- 23  -
Table 7:  MargIal  Value  Products, Actual Prices, 1987
Full
Sample  Profit  1 a/  Profit  2  Profit  3 c/  Profit  4 d/
Land Quality  9.99  4.41  6.11  4.69  10.30
Land QuantIty  40  52  94  64  109
Labor  1.22  1.31  1.52  1.43  1.76
Fertilizer  1.48  1.70  1.49  2.01  .90
Machinery  25.77  12.94  19.24  25.56  26.90
Animals  477  253  344  354  489
a/  Profit  1: Rentabel'nost <  15.70%
b/  Profit  2: 15.69%  <  Rentabel'nost < 23.65%
c/  Profit  3: 23.64%  <  RentabelPnost  < 32.01%
d/  Profit  4: 32%  < Rentabel'nost
Source:  Tables  4  and  6,  derived  from  Godovye  otchety,  Litovskals  SSR,  1987.- 24  -
Tabb  Marghi  VaMlo  Prodcts  of  Lnd  (Mbb))
Received  ReceOed  Border  Border
Prbes  PrIs  Pries  198  Prie  1987
1988  1987  (2 rubles =  $1)  (2 rubles  =  $1)
1 Hectae  Average
qualit
Full sample  107.21  40.11  145.85  89.58
Profit <  15.70%  52.43  9B.02
15.69  <  Profit <  23.65%  93.52  119.84
23.64%  <  Profit <  32.01%  64.41  110.O2
Proft  >  32%  108.79  158.93
1  Unit of quaity
(bontet)
Full sample  10.79  9.99  15.85  15.36
Protd <  15.70%  4.41  11.52
15.69  <  Profit <  23.85%  6.11  1.08
23.64%  <  Profit <  32.01%  4.69  10.30
Profit  >  32%  10.30  14.31
Sources: Tables 4, 5 and 6.- 25 -
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Endnotes
1.  Avdilants,  lu.  P.  and  A.L.  Melendorf.  Tsenoobrazovanie  v
agropromyshlennomkomplekse.  Moscow, Agropromizdat,  1989.
2.  The border prices are not adjusted for  transport  differentials within the Soviet
Unlon.  Lithuania Is small  and has a major Ice free  port  at  Kialpeda linked to
the  rest  of  the republic by a road and rall system better  than In many parts
of  the  USSR. Analysis of  Sovlet producer prices In areas more distant  from
borders would require adjustment for  transport  differentlals.
3.  These reference  prices are consistent with prices used In the SWOPSIM  model
for  the  USSR  developed by  the  Centrally Planned Economies  Division of  the
Economic  Research  Service, USDA,  but were Independently  derived (Cook, 1990).
4.  Transiog production  functlons  yielded negative marginal value  products  for
several  factors,  Including labor,  and  are  not  reported  here.  Use of  the
translog may  not  be justified  If elasticitles of  substitution  are less important
to  the analysis than are marginal  value products (Bolsvert,  1982, p. 32).  The
log llnear production functions  reported  here ylelded reasonable parameters,
and the translog did not,  even though several of  the cross  product  terms In
the translog had non-zero  estimated coefficients.
5.  Sale prices of  high and low quallty agricultural land In Minnesota  show a range
of  40 percent around the price of  land of  average quality (Schwab  and Raup,
1989).
6.  As  long  as  the  budget  constraint  for  the  parent  farm  remains soft,
Justification for  a risk  premium  Is weak.
7.  Interviews during August,  1989 with economists In the  Lithuanian Council of
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